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A set of studies conducted over the last 15 
years has produced a near consensus that the 
Social Security Disability Insurance system 
(SSDI) has substantial disincentive effects on 
the labor supply of near elderly males, diminish-
ing labor force participation, increasing the sen-
sitivity of labor force exit decisions to adverse 
economic shocks, and encouraging those near-
ing retirement to claim disability benefits and 
subsequently transfer into the Social Security 
retirement program.1 Yet, efforts by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) to encourage 
labor supply among the disabled by removing 
the work disincentives built into SSDI have been 
almost entirely unsuccessful. Most notably, in 
1999, Congress authorized the Ticket to Work 
program, which provides an array of induce-
ments for current SSDI beneficiaries to take up 
employment, including permitting a trial work 
period of up to nine months, providing 7.75 years 
of ongoing Medicare eligibility following return 
to work, and providing three years of automatic 
benefit reinstatement when claimants’ work-
place earnings fall below a threshold level. Each 
of these steps reduces the implicit tax placed 
on labor supply by the SSDI program. Despite 
these lures, fewer than 1,400 (0.01 percent) of 
the 12.2 million tickets issued to date have led 
to successful workforce integration (Autor and 
Duggan 2006).
1 On the first point, see John Bound and Timothy 
Waidmann (1992) and David C. Stapleton and Richard V. 
Burkhauser (2003). On the second point, see Daniel Black, 
Kermit Daniel, and Seth Sanders (2002) and Autor and 
Duggan (2003). On the third point, see Duggan, Perry, 
Singleton, and Jae Song (forthcoming).
Distinguishing Income from Substitution Effects in  
Disability Insurance
By David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan*
This paper calls attention to, and presents 
preliminary evidence on, a neglected explana-
tion of why efforts to encourage the disabled to 
return to work by reducing the implicit tax on 
labor supply have met with little success. Our 
core observation is that SSDI, and indeed all 
nonwork-contingent retirement programs, dis-
courage work through two channels. The first 
is the canonical substitution effect: because 
a return to work ultimately means sacrificing 
benefits (what some beneficiaries call “the cash 
cliff”), SSDI recipients face a financial incen-
tive to remain nonemployed. The second is the 
income effect—given the transfer payments 
and in-kind services (particularly medical care) 
provided by SSDI, many beneficiaries may pre-
fer leisure to labor or, more precisely, an early 
retirement, even if work is not implicitly taxed 
by the SSDI program. Concretely, a hypotheti-
cal SSDI beneficiary granted $12,000 per year 
in income support plus Medicare benefits cov-
ering an average of $7,700 annually in health 
care expenses may prefer an early retirement 
over continued participation in the labor force. 
This scenario seems particularly plausible when 
one considers that the modal SSDI recipient is a 
near-elderly male with a high-school education 
(thus, below-median potential earnings on aver-
age) and possibly a significant degree of physi-
cal discomfort in performing workplace tasks.2
The distinction between these two chan-
nels—income and substitution effects—through 
which SSDI reduces labor supply and expedites 
early retirement is central to policy. To our 
knowledge, all prior efforts by Congress and the 
SSA to increase labor force participation among 
SSDI recipients—including the Ticket to Work 
program—have targeted the substitution effect. 
That is, they have reduced the implicit tax on 
2 Reinforcing this point, Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst 
(2005) demonstrate that the fall in living standards that 
workers experience at the time of retirement is much less 
precipitous than measured declines in expenditure would 
suggest.
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work. Such policies rest on the assumption that, 
were it not for the implicit tax that SSDI levies 
on labor supply, many beneficiaries would pre-
fer to work (i.e., while keeping their benefits). 
If, however, the primary means by which SSDI 
reduces labor force participation and hastens 
retirement is through an income effect, such 
efforts may be close to ineffectual.
The conceptual distinction between income 
and substitution effects is also central to welfare 
analysis. If SSDI reduces labor supply through 
the substitution effect, this implies a deadweight 
loss. In effect, SSDI pays beneficiaries not to 
work. By contrast, reductions in labor supply that 
are due to the income effect do not imply a dead-
weight loss since there is no distortion of incen-
tives (though, of course, the funding of transfer 
programs may incur deadweight losses).
I.  Estimating Income Effects of Disability 
Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
We know of no research that attempts to dis-
tinguish income from substitution effects in the 
relationship between SSDI receipt and labor 
supply (aside from our companion work on this 
topic, Autor and Duggan 2007).3 A likely reason 
is that, since its inception, the SSDI program has 
provided benefits exclusively on a work-contin-
gent basis, so income and substitution effects 
cannot readily be separated. SSDI is not, how-
ever, the sole transfer program that provides 
income support to the nonelderly disabled. 
Though almost ignored by researchers, the US 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs Disability 
Compensation program (VDC) provides sub-
stantial cash benefits and health insurance 
through the Veterans Health Administration 
to more than 2.7 million disabled veterans of 
military service. Unlike SSDI benefits, VDC 
benefits are not work-contingent (nor are they 
means tested). Hence, any reduction in labor 
supply—generally in the form of early retire-
ment or a shift to part-time work—caused by 
the award of VDC benefits is plausibly attribut-
able to the pure “income effect” of receiving an 
unconditional, lifetime grant of monthly income 
and health insurance.
3 Dora L. Costa (1995) estimates sizable income effects 
of pension benefits on the labor supply of Union Army 
soldiers following the US Civil War. Raj Chetty (2005)
The key requirement for VDC eligibility 
is that a veteran’s disability must be caused or 
aggravated by military service. Due to this stip-
ulation, veterans rarely qualify for VDC benefits 
for medical conditions that develop late in life, 
such as cancer or diabetes, since these conditions 
are not normally directly attributable to military 
service. In 2001, a unique policy change within 
the VDC program unexpectedly extended cash 
disability benefits and enhanced medical care 
to near-elderly veterans of the Vietnam era. In 
response to a National Institute of Medicine 
study linking exposure to Agent Orange (a her-
bicide used extensively in Vietnam) to diabetes, 
the Department of Veterans’ Affairs added dia-
betes to the list of conditions for which a veteran 
who served in the Vietnam War could qualify 
for (or increase)  VDC benefits.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the unanticipated 
extension of benefits in 2001 coincided with a 
sharp break in trend in VDC enrollment. While 
in the four years prior to the policy change (1997 
though 2001), the number of VDC beneficiaries 
grew at only 0.6 percent annually, the annual 
growth rate jumped to 3.2 percent between 
2001 and 2006. Estimates by Duggan, Robert 
Rosenheck, and Perry Singleton (2006) suggest 
that the 2001 policy change increased the num-
ber of Vietnam veterans in the VDC program 
in September of 2006 by approximately 175,000 
over what it would otherwise have been (2.3 
percent of all Vietnam-era veterans still alive at 
that time). An additional 75,000 Vietnam vet-
erans (1.0 percent) who were already receiving 
VDC received an increase in their benefits as a 
result of the Agent Orange decision.4 This pol-
icy change provides an opportunity to study the 
income effect of receipt of disability benefits on 
the labor supply and retirement decisions of a 
relevant population of near-elderly individuals, 
the majority of whom were work-capable at the 
time of benefit receipt though not necessarily in 
good health.
distinguishes income from substitution effects in the effect 
of unemployment insurance benefits on job spell durations.
4 In total, approximately 11 percent of individuals who 
had “boots on the ground” in Vietnam during the conflict 
were affected directly.
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II.  Preliminary Analysis Using the Current 
Population Survey
Our informal discussion above, and a formal 
model given in Autor and Duggan (2007), sug-
gests that unanticipated increases in unearned 
income caused by the change in the VDC pro-
gram should have reduced labor supply among 
a subset of individuals affected by the policy 
despite the absence of nonwork incentives in the 
VDC program. To provide an initial test of these 
labor supply effects, we utilize data from the 
annual March Supplement to the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) for calendar years 2000 
through 2006 (earnings years 1999 through 
2005). The March CPS has a number of virtues 
for our analysis. It offers detailed individual-
level information on labor supply measures and 
it collects information on each person’s veteran 
status and lists their service era if relevant (e.g., 
Vietnam, Korea, etc.) It also provides detailed 
self-reported information on numerous compo-
nents of unearned income, including benefits 
from the Veterans Administration (VA), Social 
Security, and all other retirement and disability 
income.
Because 97 percent of Vietnam-era veterans 
are males, according to the March 2001 CPS, 
we focus exclusively on males in our empiri-
cal analyses. Additionally, nearly 80 percent of 
Vietnam-era veterans were born between 1941 
and 1952, and 30 percent of all currently living 
men born between 1941 and 1952 and alive in 
2001 were Vietnam-era veterans (with a maxi-
mum of 44 percent for the 1947 birth cohort). We 
therefore further restrict attention to Vietnam-
era veteran males born between 1941 and 1952.
We compare labor supply measures for 
Vietnam-era veterans before and after the Agent 
Orange policy change with the corresponding 
trends for observably similar individuals who 
were not directly affected. The use of an appro-
priate control group should serve to capture the 
effect of other factors, such as aging and macro-
economic conditions, that might also have influ-
enced the labor supply decisions of near-elderly 
men during our study period. Perhaps the ideal 
control group for our analysis would be Vietnam-
era veterans who did not serve in Vietnam, as 
these individuals were in the military during the 
same period as “boots on the ground” veterans, 
but their VDC coverage was not expanded simi-
larly by the Agent Orange policy. Unfortunately, 
the March CPS does not provide information on 
where veterans actually served (only when), so 
we must select an alternative control group.5
5 Our in-progress work in Autor and Duggan (2007) 
exploits detailed data from the US military to individually 
identify Vietnam-era soldiers who did and did not have 
“boots on the ground.”
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Figure 1. Number of Veterans Disability Compensation Recipients, 1976–2006
 Source: US Department of Veterans Affairs, published and unpublished data.
MAY 2007122 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
In the absence of the preferred comparison 
group, there are two other logical candidates: 
other veteran males born between 1941 and 1952 
and nonveteran males born during this same 
period. Unfortunately, there are relatively few 
veterans from other service eras in these 12 birth 
cohorts. In the 1946 to 1949 birth cohorts, the 
ratio of Vietnam-era veterans to all other veter-
ans is 14.4 to 1. In contrast, the number of nonvet-
eran males born during this period is substantial 
and exceeds the number of Vietnam-era veteran 
males in every one of our 12 birth cohorts of 
interest. We therefore use nonveteran males as 
a control group, but we emphasize that the com-
parison is not ideal. For example, according to 
the March 2001 CPS, just 4 percent of Vietnam-
era veterans born between 1941 and 1952 are 
high-school dropouts versus 15 percent of non-
veteran males born during these same years. 
Interestingly, nonveteran males are much more 
likely to have a college degree than veterans (35 
percent versus 28 percent). Recognizing that our 
treatment and control groups differed in poten-
tially important ways prior to the policy change, 
we view this CPS-based analysis as exploratory, 
with definitive evidence awaiting better data.
We estimate specifications of the following type:
(1) Yit 5  b0 VEVit 1  b1  VEVit  3 POSTt 
   1  Ait 1 Si 1 Ri 1 lt 1 1Ait 3 lt 2
  1 1Si 1 lit 2 1 1Ri 3 lt 2 1 eit.
In this equation, i and t denote individuals and 
years, respectively. The variable VEVit takes 
on a value of one if individual i is a Vietnam-
era veteran and zero otherwise. We define the 
variable POSt to equal zero in both 1999 and 
2000, prior to the policy change, and to equal 
one from 2002 through 2005. Since the policy 
change occurred in July of 2001, we set the 
POST variable to 0.5 in this year. All speci-
fications control for a vector of background 
characteristics including 12 single year-of-age 
indicators (A), four education indicators (S), 
and three race indicators (R), each interacted 
with a vector of seven year indicators (l).
The coefficient of interest in this equation is 
b1, which measures the differential change in 
the outcome variable of interest, Y, for Vietnam-
era veterans following the policy change. The 
identifying assumption of this model is that, 
absent the policy change, the change in Y 
would have been comparable for Vietnam-era 
veteran males and nonveteran males after con-
trolling for the interactions of race, education, 
and single year of age with year. Under these 
assumptions, b1 measures the average causal 
effect of the change in the VDC program on 
Vietnam-era veterans.
The first column presents estimates for the 
probability of being out of the labor force dur-
ing 1999 through 2005. The highly significant 
point estimate of 23.21 for b1 indicates that 
between 2001 and 2005, labor force participa-
tion of Vietnam-era veteran males fell by more 
than 3 percentage points relative to that of sim-
ilarly aged nonveteran males. Notably, labor 
force participation of Vietnam-era veterans 
was slightly higher than that of nonveterans in 
the pre-policy period (0.36 percentage points), 
but this contrast was not significant.
Columns 2 and 3 reveal that the differen-
tial decline in labor force participation among 
Vietnam-era veterans is accounted for, in 
roughly equal proportions, by a rise in the 
probability of being retired and a rise in the 
probability of being out of the labor force due 
to disability. Notably, veterans did not become 
significantly more likely than nonveterans to 
be out of the labor force for reasons other than 
retirement or disability (see column 4).
Complementing these findings, column 5 
shows that, after 2001, there is a significant 
increase in the probability that Vietnam-era 
veterans report a work-limiting disability or 
health condition relative to nonveteran males 
of the same age. This finding may indicate that 
there was a differential decline in the health of 
veterans after 2001. Or it may reflect the fact 
that, all else equal, those who receive disabil-
ity payments are more likely to report them-
selves as disabled (John Bound and Timothy 
Waidmann 1992; Michael Baker, Mark Stabile, 
and Catherine Deri 2004). In untabulated 
results, our March data also show a significant 
differential rise after 2001 in the probability 
that Vietnam-era vets received unearned income 
from the Veterans Administration or the Social 
Security Administration. These increases likely 
reflect a combination of disability and pension 
payments.
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One item of concern for our empirical strategy 
is also visible in Table 1. Column 5 reveals that, 
even prior to the 2001 policy change, Vietnam-
era veterans were significantly more likely (1.47 
percentage points, or 11 percent) than nonvet-
eran males to report a work-limiting disability. 
This baseline difference is by no means puz-
zling. Many Vietnam-era veterans saw com-
bat, which is known to have lasting, negative, 
long-term effects on health (Kelly Bedard and 
Olivier Deschênes 2006). Nevertheless, this 
contrast underscores that nonveteran males 
provide an imperfect comparison group for 
veteran males of comparable age.
III.  Conclusions
Our results provide initial evidence that the 
increase in unearned income resulting from the 
expansion of the VDC program’s medical eli-
gibility criteria in 2001 substantially reduced 
labor-force participation among Vietnam-era 
veterans. Such large behavioral responses to 
the VDC program are noteworthy given that the 
program does not affect the incentive to work 
as does the SSDI program and its means-tested 
counterpart the Supplemental Security Income 
program. These findings, therefore, highlight 
the possibility that income effects on labor sup-
ply may be sizable for near-elderly adults in 
moderate to poor health.
We stress that these results must be viewed as 
preliminary. Perhaps the most important limi-
tation of our analysis is that nonveteran males 
differ in many observable and presumably unob-
servable ways from Vietnam-era veteran males. 
Thus, the differential declines in labor supply 
observed here may have occurred even in the 
absence of this policy change. A definitive test 
of the labor-supply response to the extension of 
VDC benefits awaits better data (which we are 
currently compiling).
Accurately assessing the magnitude of income 
and substitution effects of receipt of transfer 
income on labor supply is critical to US dis-
ability policy. While economists have typically 
regarded the substantial reductions in labor force 
participation associated with receipt of disabil-
ity benefits as an incentive problem (i.e., a sub-
stitution effect), it appears plausible to us that a 
significant share of this response is explained by 
the (nonincentive) income effect. When granted 
permanent, inflation-indexed income and gov-
ernment-provided health insurance, many near-
elderly adults in moderate to poor health may 
prefer an early retirement to continued labor 
force participation. If so, there may be limited 
scope for public policy to increase a return to 
work among nonelderly disability recipients 
by reducing the implicit tax on labor income 
as is done, for example, by the Social Secur-
ity Administration’s Ticket-to-Work program. 
For this reason and the others outlined above, 
Table 1—Measures of Labor Force Attachment Before and After the 2001 Policy Change:  
Contrasting Vietnam Era Veteran versus Non-Veteran Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NILF NILF–Retired NILF–Disabled NILF–Other Any disability
Vietnam-era veteran 0.36 0.92* 0.09 20.66* 1.47*
(0.64) (0.41) (0.47) (0.27) (0.59)
VEV * Post 3.21* 1.77* 1.31* 0.12 1.30*
(0.85) (0.59) (0.61) (0.34) (0.75)
Mean 20.1 8.6 8.6 2.8 13.5
R-squared 0.091 0.086 0.068 0.008 0.062
Notes: Table entries represent coefficient estimates from linear probability models. The dependent variable for each speci-
fication is listed at the top of each column. “NILF” denotes Not in Labor Force. All specifications include race (three cat-
egories) by year interactions, education (four categories) by year interactions, and age (12 single-year categories) by year 
interactions. The number of observations is 75,952 in all specifications. Sample includes all Vietnam-era veteran males and 
all nonveteran males born between 1941 and 1952 inclusive (with year-of-birth approximated as survey year–1–age). Seven 
years of the March CPS (2000–2006) are used. Specifications are weighted by person weights (scaled by the inverse of the 
sum of person weights for the sample) and robust standard errors are included in parentheses. Coefficient estimates and stan-
dard errors are multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.
* Signficantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
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further study of the effect of the labor supply 
effects of the VDC program—which currently 
provides cash benefits and health insurance to 
more than 11 percent of military veterans—is 
warranted.
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